L’ordine pubblico: uniti nella diversità… nel matrimonio? by Marino, Silvia
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2021), Vol. 13, Nº 2, pp. 1022-1031
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt - DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2021.6312
1022
PUBLIC POLICY: UNITED IN DIVERSITY… 
WITHIN THE MARRIAGE?




Università degli Studi dell’Insubria, Como/Varese
Recibido: 18.05.2021 / Aceptado: 07.06.2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2021.6312
Riassunto: Il presente lavoro indaga lo sviluppo della nozione di ordine pubblico nella definizione 
di matrimonio. Prendendo le mosse dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea 
nell’ambito della libera circolazione delle persone e della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo sul di-
ritto alla vita privata e familiare, sono analizzate le incertezze derivanti dalle divergenze normative 
nazionali. Quindi, è esaminato l’impatto della sentenza Coman della Corte di giustizia sia nell’ambito 
dell’applicazione dei regolamenti dell’Unione europea nella cooperazione giudiziaria civile, sia nel-
la nozione di ordine pubblico. Conclusivamente, sono proposte alcune considerazioni sulle funzioni 
dell’ordine pubblico in chiave moderna.
Parole chiave: ordine pubblico, diritto di famiglia europeo, libera circolazione, diritto alla vita 
familiare, nozione di matrimonio.
Abstract: The present paper tackles the development of the notion of public policy in the defini-
tion of the concept of marriage. It starts from brief remarks on the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in the field of the right to free movement of people and of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the right to private and family life. Then, it analyses the uncertainties stemming from 
the national divergences. Further, the impact of the Coman case on the applicability of EU measures on 
civil judicial cooperation and on the notion of public policy is examined. Conclusively, the paper sub-
mits some considerations on the modern function of the public policy.
Keywords: public policy, European family law, free movement, right to family life, notion of 
marriage
Summary: I. Introduction: the wave towards Europeanisation of public policy. II. The Euro-
peanisation of the notion of public policy: the concept of marriage in the European Union. III. The 
Europeanisation of the notion of public policy: the marriage and the right to family life, according to 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. IV. The uncertainties derived from the national 
differences in family law. V. A push towards modernisation? The Coman case. VI. The impact of the 
Coman case… A. … on the civil judicial cooperation B. …. and on the notion of public policy.  VII. 
Some concluding remarks.
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Public policy: united in diversity…within the marriage?Silvia Marino
I. Introduction: the wave towards Europeanisation of public policy
1. The Europeanisation of the notion of public policy can be considered as a straightforward 
example of the European Union (thereafter: EU) motto “United in Diversity”. Indeed, the concept of 
public policy itself is based on the differences of national values that coexist in the global community. 
At the same time, the voluntary or implied acceptance of common values unifies the general principles 
of the States and further their laws, in an implied development towards unification.
2. This tension between differentiation and harmonisation can lead to frictions between the 
State(s), faithful to its/their traditional values, and the centralised institution, pushing towards a more 
efficient coordination of the legislations. While fields with an economic core have barely given rise to 
conflicts with the public policy, especially in the relationships between EU Member States1, the opposite 
seems true in the field of family law. The national sensitiveness in this matter prevents a “top-down” 
harmonisation2, favoured and led by a centralised institution.
3. Nevertheless, the share of common values can unlikely be pursued by other means, different 
from the development of the supranational case law and the approximation of national legislation. In-
deed, in the European perspective, both the EU and the Council of Europe lack competences in family 
law, according to their funding Treaties.
4. Indeed, art. 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereafter: ECHR) grants the 
rights to private and family life without providing for definitions, nor distinguishing the two rights; 
neither art. 12 on the right to marriage defines it. The European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: 
ECtHR) can only include the case at stake in one of these rights and try to offer general definitions for 
the sake of legal certainty. However, this power is not always enough in order to push the modification 
of national law3, the sole exception being the ascertainment of a structural violation of the ECHR4.
5. The European Union (EU) has a clear competence in family law only for its cross-border as-
pects within the civil judicial cooperation. A strong hurdle in the harmonisation of this field rests on the 
1 Thus, these conflicts have been immediately detected due to the serious impairment of national values. The issue has been 
deeply discussed during the prospected recast of the Brussels I Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 
2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12, 16 January 
2001, p. 1: P. BeauMont, e. JohnSton, “Abolition of the Exequatur in Brussels I: Is a Public Policy Defence Necessary for the pro-
tection of Human Rights?”, IPRax, 2010, p. 110; P. oBerhaMMer, “The Abolition of Exequatur”, IPRax, 2010, p. 197; P. SchloSS-
er, “The Abolition of Exequatur Proceedings – Including Public Policy Review?”, IPRax, 2010, p. 101; S. corneloup, “The 
Public Policy Exception in Brussels I Practice”, Int’l Lis, 2011, p. 45; M. requeJo iSidro, “On the Abolition of Exequatur”, en B. 
heSS, M. BergStröM y e. StorSkruBB (eds.), EU Civil Justice. Current Issues and Future Outlook, London, Hart, 2015, p. 283.
2 M. antokolSkaia, “Harmonisation of Substantive Family Law in Europe; Myths and Reality”, Child & Family Law 
Quarterly, 2010, p. 400.
3 Furthermore, ECtHR’s judgments might lack a direct effect in the faulty State: J. gerardS, J. Fleuren (Coord.), Imple-
mentation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the judgments of the ECTHR in national case-law. A com-
parative analysis, Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia, 2014; a. oSti, “L’implementazione delle sentenze della Corte 
europea dei diritti e le resistenze nazionali: tre modelli a confronto”, Quaderni costituzionali, 2017, p. 851 ff. The lack of direct 
effect of the ECHR system is confirmed by the CJEU 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, case C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105.
4 p. pirrone, L’obbligo di conformarsi alle sentenze della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, Milano, Giuffrè, 2004; a. 
drzeMczewSki, “Art. 46. Forza vincolante ed esecuzione delle sentenze”, en S. Bartole, B. conForti, g. raiMondi (Coord.), 
Commentario alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, Padova, Cedam, 2001; 
w. SadurSki, “‘Partnering with Strasbourg’, Constitutionalisation of the ECtHR, the Accession of Central and East European 
States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments”, Human Rights Law Review, 2009, p. 448; P. leach, h. 
hardMan, S. StephenSon, B. Blitz, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations: An Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ of the 
European Court of Human Rights and Their Impact at National Level, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010; S. greer, l. wildhaBer, 
“Revisiting the Debate about ‘constitutionalising’ the European Court of Human Rights”, Human Rights Law Review, 2013, 
p. 671; r. greco, “Le sentenze “pilota” della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo: efficacia ultra partes?”, Processo penale e 
giustizia, 2015, p. 105; d. kurBan, “Forsaking Individual Justice: The Implications of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Pilot Judgment Procedure for Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations”, Human Rights Law Review, 2016, p. 731 ff.
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wording of art. 81(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, since it requires unanimity 
within the Council. The recent practice has demonstrated the difficulties to reach this threshold, so that it 
has proven necessary to adopt regulations establishing enhanced cooperation, binding a limited number 
of Member States5.
6. Despite the lack of competence in family law and the firm limits of the competences con-
ferred, the development of the free movement within the EU and the promotion of human rights by 
the ECtHR stimulate a convergence of legal notions, concepts and values among European States and 
especially EU Member States. On the other side, the latter’s exclusive competence in family law (and 
an ECtHR’s restrictive approach to article 12 of the ECHR6) is a constant trend towards nationalisation 
and particularism in this field.
II. The Europeanisation of the notion of public policy: the concept of marriage in the European 
Union
7. The right to family reunification has been a rich field for the building convergence of the pillar 
notions of family law. The first enacted measure was Regulation No. 1612/1968 on freedom of move-
ment for workers7 (Title III). Pursuant to art. 10, the workers’ family members enjoyed the right to install 
themselves with the cross-border worker, irrespective of their nationality8. Subsequent Directive 73/1489 
follows the same path on the rights to establishment and to the provision of services10.
8. Family members were listed according to a classic “male breadwinner” model11, in a quite 
perfect consonance with national family laws of the then 6 Member States. As a consequence, defini-
tions of the family, the family ties or the marriage were not provided for. Families were mostly com-
posed of married man and woman, with their common children. Other situations were not covered by 
the law, and, in some cases, were even considered such as socially unacceptable. There was barely the 
doubt that the sole social formation that could be entitled with rights was the family based on marriage 
between a man and a woman. (EEC) EU law resilience to the national common standards, as sources 
of inspiration, prevented any conflict with national laws. No issues related to public policy could arise.
9. Directive No. 2004/3812 was enacted in a completely different social environment, but it is not 
possible to detect a development of the notion of marriage, nor of the normative method employed, the 
5 Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law 
applicable to divorce and legal separation, OJ L 343, 29 December 2010, p. 10; Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 
2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, OJ L 183, 8 July 2016, p. 1; Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 
June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships, OJ L 183, 8 July 2016, p. 30.
6 See below, para. III.
7 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Com-
munity, OJ L 257, 19 October 1968, p. 2.
8 Some more conditions were requested concerning the housing of the family in the State of destination: CJEU 18 May 
1989, case 249/86, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:1989:204.
9 Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services, OJ L 172/14, 28 June 
1973, p. 14.
10 c. Mcglynn, “The Europeanisation of Family Law”, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 2000, p. 36.
11 J. Mulder, “Some more equal than others? Matrimonial benefits and the CJEU’s case law on discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2019, p. 509.
12 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30 April 2004, p. 77.
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listing of the beneficiaries13. The only significant advancement was the inclusion of the partner within 
this list, although to a limited extent14.
10. The development of the Europeanisation of the main notions of family law has been pushed 
by the case law of the CJEU from the mid-90ies. The principle of non-discrimination played an impor-
tant role in the definition of the family status. We only need to consider the well-known judgment P. 
and S., dated back to 199615, where the Court detected a discrimination grounded on sex due to a gender 
reassignment. The CJEU was prevented from considering stable relationships between same-sex part-
ners as equivalent to marriage16 due to the exclusive national competence in the field. Indeed, although 
a choice towards modernisation of national legislations was left to Member States17, discriminations (as 
compared to opposite-sex couples) were nonetheless declared not admissible18. National family law had 
to be set aside to the extent that it could potentially cause hindrances to the EU citizens’ right to move-
ment, provoking discriminations. 
11. This case law had an immediate impact on the national notions of public policy, making them 
more flexible. The principle of non-discrimination becomes a main common value able to supersede, 
where needed, different national principles, such as the defense of the traditional family model. The na-
tional public policy must retract when faced up to a concrete risk of discrimination due to its application. 
Therefore, it prevents considering affective relationships different from the classic opposite-sex married 
couple as conflicting with national values. The door towards potential conflicts between international 
needs and national traditions is here open: the legitimate differences in the national legislations must be 
sound with the new (or renovated) common values, among which the principle of non-discrimination is 
put at the highest level.
12. Another tool has silently developed the notion of family within the EU. It is the enactment 
of regulations in the field of the civil judicial cooperation, concerning family law and related issues19. 
These measures worked in two directions. Firstly, the regulations do not define the marriage, it leaving 
a wide margin of appreciation in its interpretation. Despite this, scholars tend to agree on its gender neu-
trality20. Secondly, Regulation 2016/1104 is devoted to registered partnerships, that finally enter into the 
EU legislation and established lexicon. Surprisingly, this Regulation provides a definition of registered 
partnerships, which are “the regime governing the shared life of two people which is provided for in law, 
the registration of which is mandatory under that law and which fulfils the legal formalities required by 
13 e. guild, S. peerS y J. toMkin (eds.), The EU Citizenship Directive: A Commentary (2nd edition), Oxford, OUP, 2019.
14 The CJEU recently made clear that this duty applies even when the EU citizen returns with the partner to the Member 
State of origin/citizenship (CJEU 12 July 2018, case C-89/17, Banger, EU:C:2018:570).
15 CJEU 30 April 1996, case C-13/94, P. and S., EU:C:1996:170.
16 c. ricci, “La «famiglia» nella giurisprudenza comunitaria”, en S. Bariatti (Coord.), La famiglia nel diritto internazio-
nale privato comunitario, Milano, Giuffré, 2007, p. 100 ff.
17 CJEU 17 February 1998, case C-249/96, Grant, EU:C:1998:63. 
18 CJEU 17 April 1986, case C-59/85, Reed, EU:C:1986:157; CJEU 1 April 2008, case C-267/06, Maruko, EU:C:2008:179; 
CJEU 10 May 2011, case C-147/08, Römer, EU:C:2011:286; CJEU 6 December 2012, joined cases C-124/11, C-125/11 and 
C-143/11, Dittrich and o., EU:C:2012:771.
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, 
OJ L 338, 23 December 2003, p. 1; Regulation no 1259/2010, Regulation 2016/1103; Regulation No 2016/1104.
20 M. Meli, “Il dialogo tra ordinamenti nazionali e ordinamento comunitario: gli sviluppi più recenti in materia di diritto di 
famiglia”, Europa e diritto privato, 2007, p. 473; k. Boele-woelki, “Brüssel II: Die Verordnung über die Zuständigkeit und 
die Anerkennung von Entscheidungen in Ehesachen”, Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung, 2011, p. 127; P. Franzina, “The law 
applicable to divorce and legal separation under regulation (EU) no. 1259/2010 of 20 december 20102, Cuadernos de Dere-
cho Transnacional, 2011, n. 2, p. 102; G. roSSolillo, “Art. 1”, en p. Franzina (Coord.), Regolamento (UE) n. 1259/2010 del 
Consiglio del 20 dicembre 2010, relativo all’attuazione di una cooperazione rafforzata nel settore della legge applicabile al 
divorzio e alla separazione personale, Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate, 2011, p. 1452; P. haMMJe, “Le nouveau règlement (UE) 
n. 1259/2010 du Conseil du 20 octobre 2010 mettant en œuvre une coopération renforcée dans le domain de la loi applicabile 
au divorce et à la séparation de corps”, Revue critique de droit international privé, 2011, p. 300; P. wautelet, Private inter-
national law aspects of same-sex marriages and partnerships in Europe- Divided we stand?, en k. Boele-woelki, a. FuchS 
(Coord.) Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe, Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia, 2012, p. 145. 
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that law for its creation” (art. 3(1)(a)). It is the first definition ever from the EU on any family law institu-
tion, which can be even disputed, since the lack of competence could have prevented the EU therefrom.
13. Last but not least, art. 9 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU modernises art. 
8 of the ECHR21, avoiding references to the sex of the spouses. Nevertheless, there is not yet a consistent 
CJEU’s case law on this rule, so that it is not possible to state the impact of its gender-neutral formula-
tion. The only anchorage is to be found in art. 52(3) of the Charter, that bases its minimum standard level 
in the ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR.
14. These developments do not impose any duty to Member States to provide for completely 
gender-neutral family institutions, but push on the rights of non-discrimination (grounded on nationality 
and/or sex and/or sexual orientation)22, and to free movement. Consequently, the Court cannot demand 
Member States to modify their national family law: it can only avoid discriminations in the national 
regulation on family law and in the grant of free movement rights.
III. The Europeanisation of the notion of public policy: the marriage and the right to family life, 
according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
15. The ECHR envisages two provisions on family law, art. 12 on the right to marriage and art. 
8 on the right to private and family life. The latter has the leading role in the development of the notion 
of public policy in family law23.
16. The ECtHR prefers a quite traditional interpretation of the right to marry under art. 12, since 
its application is reserved to couples formed by a man and a woman, not covering same-sex marriages. 
The ECtHR grounds its judgments on the general consensus among contracting States24, which can be 
identified only in favour of the heterosexual marriage. This statement has been repeated even quite re-
cently, as for example in the case Hämäläinen25. Furthermore, Article 12 has only a “positive meaning”, 
in the sense that it grants the right to marry (creation of a civil status), but not to divorce (dissolution of 
status). This is stated in the judgment Johnston26: despite the very particular political circumstances of 
the case at stake27, the ECtHR has never contradicted nor overruled this outcome.
17. The ECtHR’s self-restrain in these cases has not hindered a further progression of the notion 
of family life, that has proved indispensable for the modernisation of the notion of public policy. Every 
development has rested on art. 8, where the lack of definitions has allowed its dynamic interpretation. To 
the extent that the right to private life covers the right to enter into a relationship with any person of one’s 
21 See below, para. III.
22 Further: G. de Baere, k. gutMan, “The impact of the European Union and the European Court of Justice on European 
Family Law”, en J. Scherpe (Coord.), European Family Law, vol. I. The Impact of institutions and Organisations on European 
Family Law, Cheltenham, Elgar, 2016, p. 12.
23 Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice expressed the view that art. 8 ECHR is a “whole code of family law” (Dissenting Opinion 
to ECtHR, 13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium, para. 15).
24 l. hodSon, “A Marriage by Any Other Name? Schalk and Kopf v Austria”, Human Rights Law Review, 2011, p. 176; 
L. wildhaBer, a. hJartarSon, S. donnelly, “No Consensus on Consensus. The Practice of the European Court of Human 
Rights”, Human Rights Law Journal, 2013, p. 248.
25 ECtHR, 16 July 2014, Hämäläinen v. Finland.
26 ECtHR, 18 December 1986, Johnston and Others v. Ireland.
27 The Irish People was expected to vote a constitutional referendum abolishing the prohibition on divorce. Statistics on 
the results are available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenth_Amendment_of_the_Constitution_Bill_1986_(Ireland). For 
the sensitive balance between politics and civil rights at that time: S. cretney, “Breaking the Shackles of Culture and Religion 
in the field of divorce?”, en k. Boele-woelki (Coord.), Common Core and Better Law in European Family Law, Antwerp, 
Oxford, Intersentia, 2005, p. 3; M. antokolSkaia, “Divorce law in a European Perspective”, en J. Scherpe (Coord.), European 
Family Law, vol. III. Family Law in a European Perspective, Cheltenham, Elgar, 2016, p. 58.
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choice, according to the consistent ECtHR’s case law, affective unions are immediately included therein. 
In this framework, family life is not only the life organised within the standards codified in art. 12 ECHR.
18. The clearest example of the evolution of the notion of family law in Europe stems from the 
comparison of the Rees and the Goodwin cases28. The elapsing of time (16 years) made it possible to reach 
completely different outputs despite the wide similarity of the cases. Only after Goodwin, the ECtHR has 
included the marriage of the transsexual person within the protection of the right to a family life.
19. In Schalk and Kopf29 the ECtHR recognised for the first time that same-sex relationships 
are covered by the right to family (and not private) life, again without offering any tentative definition 
of the family or of the family right. This development is due to the modification of the Contracting 
States’ general consensus, gathered from the fact that a meaningful group of States had provided for a 
legal form of recognition for these couples. This output would not have been possible without previous 
national developments30.
20. This characterisation impacts on the duties of the States, whose margin of appreciation is li-
mited, once they establish an internal regulation on same-sex partnerships. It allows the extension of the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination in favour of the partners and of the partnerships. Since 
those Member States, admitting same-sex marriage, cannot refuse to accept “foreign” same-sex marria-
ges (e.g. celebrated abroad, or between foreigners), Member States, regulating registered partnerships, 
cannot avoid to recognise similar institutions created abroad. Furthermore, according to the Vallianatos 
judgment, if States provide for any status different from marriage, as registered partnership, this must 
be open to same-sex couples, too31.
21. The latest developments regard the needed formal recognition for partnerships at the natio-
nal level32, with a margin of appreciation only in the enactment of an efficient legislation (which could 
be reserved to same-sex partners and not extended to heterosexual partnerships33). Still, Contracting 
States are not under a duty to recognise unknown institutions created abroad, as the same-sex marriage34.
22. This case law is of the utmost meaning for the harmonisation of the notion of public policy. 
Indeed, the principle of non-discrimination has strongly entered into family law, so that the gender and 
the sexual orientation shall not jeopardise the existence of family relationships and the full enjoyment 
thereof. Despite the continuing legitimate differences among Contracting Parties legislations, there is a 
common core of rights that shall be granted to every couple and to every person within the couple. This 
common core is part of the European public policy that “must be shared” by European States, and cannot 
be further changed by purely national traditions or values.
IV. The uncertainties derived from the national differences in family law
23. In this framework, it is possible to detect frictions between harmonisation and nationalisa-
tion, modernisation and traditionalism. The more conservative approach depends on the national exclu-
sive competences of the Member States in family law, and by the cautious interpretation of Article 12 
28 ECtHR, 17 October 1986, Rees v. UK; ECtHR, 11 July 2002, Goodwin v. UK.
29 ECtHR, 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria.
30 p. Mahoney, “Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?”, Human Rights Law Journal, 1998, 
p. 1 ff.; h. Fulchiron, “Un modèle familial européen?”, en h. Fulchiron, c. Bidaud-garon (Coord.), Vers un statut européen 
de la famille, Paris, Dalloz, 2014, p. 171 ff.
31 ECtHR, 11 July 2013, Vallianatos v. Greece.
32 ECtHR, 1 July 2015, Oliari and o. v. Italy.
33 ECtHR, 26 October 2017, Ratzenböck and Seydl v. Austria.
34 ECtHR, 14 December 2017, Orlandi v. Italy.
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of the ECHR. On the other side, progressive inputs stem from the extensive approach to Article 8 of the 
ECHR and the CJEU’s case law on the EU free movement. These different trends avert the possibility to 
define coherently a shared concept of family law and of the marriage, even in an integrated system such 
as the EU, wider or different from the heterosexual marriage.
24. The definitions might depend on several variables. The first is the national legislation due 
to the exclusive jurisdiction to legislate. For example, if a State does not recognise a family institution, 
as same-sex marriages, hardly that legal system can accept that the equivalent institution – regulated 
by any foreign law - is part of family law35. The harmonisation of the concept of public policy can stem 
only from a top-down constrain, in this case. The second is the integration of the State in the European 
dimension, which can push towards the acceptance of different family models and, in any case, an open-
ness to foreign values. 
25. The classic theme against any approximation of family law stimulated by a centralised or-
ganisation, be it the EU or the Council of Europe, is the cultural constraint argument36. Family law is 
regarded as a legal issue strictly linked with the specific culture of a State. Therefore, approximation 
and convergence might even be felt as impossible by the State, because it would lose part of the national 
culture37.
26. In this framework, the notion of public policy gains a primary momentum. The lack of any 
closer harmonisation of family law, starting from the marriage, makes it necessary to keep strength on 
the fundamental rights, the right to family life pursuant to the ECHR and the right to free movement in 
the EU. The possible commonality and flexibilisation of the concept of public policy safeguard the na-
tional legislative choices but at the same time allows openness and a better understanding of the others’ 
rules and values.
V. A push towards modernisation? The Coman case
27. These final remarks could appear to be contradicted by the CJEU’s judgment in the Coman 
case38, which stems from the persisting differences among Member States in family law. Indeed, it can 
seem as a forced top down harmonisation through case law. On the contrary, here the CJEU limited itself 
to interpret the notion of spouse for the sole purposes of the free movement of persons within the EU39. 
Accordingly, Member States must confer that minimum legal value to the foreign marriage, which is 
needed in order to grant the right to family reunification for the third-country national spouse. This is 
true even if the State has been traditionally considering same-sex marriages such as contrary to its public 
35 Italy represents a very positive exception to this consideration. The Supreme Court has accepted the characterisation 
pushed by the ECtHR, in the sense that a same-sex marriage is part of the family life of the spouses, notwithstanding the im-
possibility to recognise it in the Italian legal system (Corte di Cassazione, 15 March 2012, n. 4184).
36 D. Bradley, “A Note on Comparative Family Law: Problems, Perspectives, Issues and Politics”, cit., p. 4; M. antokol-
Skaia, “Family law and national culture. Arguing against the cultural constraints argument”, Utrecht Law Review, 2008, p. 25.
37 M. antokolSkaia, Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe: a Historical Perspective, Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, 
Intersentia, 2006, p. 39.
38 CJEU 5 June 2018, case C-673/16, Coman, EU:C:2018:385.
39 For further analysis: A. Favi, “Causa C-673/16 – Il matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso contratto in uno Stato UE 
va riconosciuto in tutti gli altri Stati membri al fine di garantire la libera circolazione e soggiorno del cittadino dell’Unione 
(2/2018)”, available at: https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/rubriche/fonti-unione-europea-e-internazionali/2171-osf-
2-2018-ue-2; S. penaSa, “Matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso e libertà di circolazione dei cittadini europei e dei loro 
familiari: osservazioni a “cerchi concentrici” sul caso Coman c. Romania della Corte di giustizia”, Diritto, Immigrazione e 
Cittadinanza, 2018, n. 3, p. 1; g. roSSolillo, “Corte di giustizia, matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso e diritti fondamen-
tali: il caso Coman”, available at: http://www.sidiblog.org/2018/07/08/corte-di-giustizia-matrimonio-tra-persone-dello-stesso-
sesso-e-diritti-fondamentali-il-caso-coman/; a. tryFonidou, “The ECJ Recognises the Right of Same-Sex Spouses to Move 
Freely Between EU Member States: The Coman ruling”, European Law Review, 2019, p. 663; u. BelavuSau, d. kochenov, 
“Same-sex spouses: More free movement, but what about marriage?”, Common Market Law Review, 2020, p. 227.
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policy, consequently not admitting them in its internal legislation, neither recognising those celebrated 
abroad according to a foreign law.
28. The decision as such seems quite limited because of the legal reasoning behind it and the 
expressed practical consequences. This is due to the fact that the preliminary question itself was quite 
limited40, too. Consequently, the judgment does not tackle some main issues in the perspective of both 
the private international law and the free movement41. Furthermore, the solution is far from innovative, 
due to other national similar previous experiences42.
29. In this judgment it is possible to detect only a rush towards modernisation pushed by the 
CJEU, but no revolutions. One main legal ground justifies the CJEU’s development: the free movement 
of the EU citizen, that risks being refrained from the exercise of his/her rights to circulation, if his/her 
family ties have no legal value at his/her return to the State of citizenship. States are required to treat 
these sensitive issues with openness, so that the EU citizens’ rights are not to be jeopardized. Only as the 
last consequence, the right to family life of the spouses is protected. This reasoning allows the couple at 
stake to enjoy the marriage living together, without fearing expulsions or even criminal sanctions against 
the non-EU spouse. Consequently, at least one same-sex married couple lives legally in Romania: the 
Coman – Hamilton couple.
VI. The impact of the Coman case… 
1. … on the civil judicial cooperation
30. Although the current practical issues of the same-sex spouses seem partially resolved, the 
judgment leaves it open to some further questions. Some issues have a practical relevance because of 
the potential applicability of EU private international law regulations on family law. Thus, the Coman 
- Hamilton family situation challenges the applicability of EU regulations, potentially impairing the 
uniform application of EU law.
31. Let’s keep considering the Coman - Hamilton couple. Are EU regulations on civil judicial 
cooperation in family matters applicable to their marriage? Provided that Romania does not take part 
to the enhanced cooperation established with the twin regulations of 2016, how will this relationship 
be dealt with, according to the national law? In the field of maintenance, must Romania consider this 
couple such as a «family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity» according to art. 1(1) of the regu-
lation no. 4/200943 for the determination of its material scope of application?
40 M. graSSi, “Sul riconoscimento dei matrimoni contratti all’estero tra persone dello stesso sesso: il caso Coman”, Rivista 
di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 2019, p. 65.
41 These are, for example: the validity of the status acquired abroad, from the perspective of the Member State of origin, 
which remains free to regulate the marriage and the family ties, and the Member State of destination, responsible for setting 
the conditions for its recognition; the impact of the judgment on the whole range of personal and patrimonial effects of the 
marriage. For these issues, the solutions remain those stemming from the scarce ECtHR’s case law within the field and those 
debated by the scholars.
42 The Tribunal administratif du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 3 October 2005 recognised a residence permit to a non-EU 
citizen married to a same-sex Belgian citizen where the marriage was celebrated in Belgium. The Tribunale di Reggio Emilia 
and the Tribunale di Pescara (Italy; Tribunale di Reggio Emilia, 1st Civil Section, decree 13 February 2012, available at: http://
www.articolo29.it/decisioni/tribunale-di-reggio-emilia-prima-sezione-civile-decreto-del-13-febbraio-2012/, accessed on 15 
November 2020; Tribunale di Pescara, ord. 15 January 2013, available at: http://www.articolo29.it/decisioni/tribunale-di-pes-
cara-ordinanza-del-15-gennaio-2013/, accessed on 15 November 2020) reached the same conclusions with regard to respec-
tively a Spanish and a Portuguese same - sex marriage. The solution is known outside the EU, too (y. Merin, “Anglo-American 
Choice of Law and the Recognition of Foreign Same-sex Marriages in Israel – on religious Norms and Secular Reforms”, 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2011, p. 509).
43 Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement 
of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L 7, 10 January 2009, p. 1.
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32. The characterisation might completely change the output on the jurisdiction and on the 
applicable law. Let’s suppose that the couple moves to Italy, where same-sex partnerships are regulated 
but same-sex marriages are not admitted. Shall Italy apply the regulation on the matrimonial property 
regimes, or the one on the patrimonial effects of registered partnerships, or, finally, neither, since this re-
lationship is not a marriage according to national law, neither a partnership according to the law applied 
to the creation of the status?
33. These issues are not only related to the scope of application of the regulations, but to the hu-
man rights indirectly protected therewith. If the grant of a residence permit correctly preserves the right 
to family life, the application of the succession, the maintenance or the property regime (but which one?) 
regulations ensure the legal certainty on the assets for the present and for the future, thus protecting the 
right to private property. The applicability of the divorce regulations produces the same effect in relation 
to the right to private life, to be interpreted in this case as the right not to be involved in a relationship 
with a person.
34. In that perspective, one can wonder whether the judgment has potentially extensive effects, 
insisting on the fundamental rights, that risk being jeopardised if the couple is not treated as a married 
couple. There can be an escape within the judgment. It appears to be coherent, if, instead of the repeated 
words ‘for the sole purpose of granting a derived right of residence’, we put “for the sole purpose of gran-
ting a pension”, or succession rights, or personal rights, etc. Therefore, for the sake of legal certainty and 
of the protection of the full set of the fundamental rights of the couple and of the individuals, it is possible 
to «recognise» the singles’ needed effects, to the extent that the recognition of the status is not possible44.
2. …on the notion of public policy
35. Without any need to go deeper in the notion of public policy as a national limit to be invoked 
even against the free movement, the judgment impacts strongly upon it. The concrete consequence is in 
the sense that Member States cannot preclude the issue of a residence permit for family reunification, 
based on same-sex marriage45, since this does not impair the national public policy46.
36. This does not mean that same-sex marriages are not intended to offend the national public 
policy. If this were the case, the judgment’s reasoning would not have been limited to a discourse on the 
free movement. Here lies the difference between the recognition of the status as such and the allowance 
of the residence permit. The former is not required after this case. Therefore, the State can refuse its 
recognition because of public policy reasons. The latter is mandatory for the protection of other rights, 
such as the right to free movement within the EU and the right to family life.
37. Traditionally, from von Savigny’s time47, one of the examples of possible opposition of a fo-
reign law to public policy has been the unknown institution. On the opposite, in this judgment is appears 
a scission. The unknown foreign institution can be refused, but it must be able to produce some legal 
effects, notwithstanding its blatant contradiction with public policy. Some Member States courts have 
started to accept this principle, thus declaring that same-sex spouses enjoy the constitutionally protected 
44 Preliminary questions on personal status are starting being submitted to the Court: Opinion of the Advocate general 
Kokott, 15 April 2021, case C-490/20, V.M.A., EU:C:2021:296; reference for preliminary ruling in case C-2/21, Rzecznik Praw 
Obywatelskich.
On the same basis the Advocate general Kokott in the opinion in the V.M.A. case suggests that the refusal to issue a national 
birth certificate amounts to a violation of the rights to free movement of the Bulgarian mother, married with a UK citizen fe-
male, who gave birth to a child in Spain.
46 M. BoSch, c. Mariottini, “the European model of “couple” within the dissolution of marriage”, en e. Bernard, M. 
creSp, M. ho-dac (eds.), La famille dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2020, p. 189.
47 F.c. von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, 1886.
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right to family life48, so that the residence permit shall be issued49. In most cases it is possible to detect 
a very open approach, that allows the recognition of the marriage exactly as a marriage, despite the lack 
of national regulation of same-sex marriages50.
38. The judgment mitigates the edges of the notion of public policy, because the national juris-
diction must be permeated by the effects of foreign undesired institutions. The State at stake is required 
to leave the foreign same-sex marriage interpenetrate through the Europeanised textile of public policy. 
The respect of the European freedom of movement and of the right to family life requires it.
VII. Some concluding remarks
39. The CJEU’s approach in this case appeared effective in order to balance the exclusive com-
petence of Member States in family law and the right to free movement of the couple concerned. It does 
not infer the recognition of the status, neither an evaluation of its validity: it simply allows the spouses 
to benefit from some of the rights dependent on the marriage.
40. However, an open approach towards the individuals’ and the couples’ rights is already quite 
common within some EU Member States. The credits of this judgment are to be found in the impact on 
the functioning of the public policy. Indeed, it becomes less stringent even in those situations that are 
not directly affected by the EU harmonisation, that could appear marginal to the European integration 
and that are left to the exclusive national competence to legislate.
41. The values and principles included in the notion of public policy have changed in the last 
years. Now, its structure and function are developing, too. It does not anymore serve the sole need to 
grant the coherence of a national jurisdiction. Rather, the part of the public policy made up by EU and 
European fundamental rights integrates national constitutional rights51. Through this way, public policy 
is a means to claim an open approach towards situations and status created abroad, in consonance with 
those rights.
42. Therefore, the public policy is not anymore a severe policeman, sanctioning the infringe-
ment with the high penalty of closing the border to the reception of foreign values and laws. Rather it 
is a careful parent, that prevents big harms only. These values are graduated in a sort of – covered and 
unsaid – hierarchy, so that the protection of national values cannot hamper the enjoyment of the EU 
individuals’ fundamental freedoms and the principle of non-discrimination. The primacy reigns over 
the values to be included within the public policy, so that the European rights must prime over national 
principles, even against the will of the State. In a “divergent unity”, such as that created with EU Law, 
all values are equal, but some values are more equal than others.
48 Decision of the Supreme Court of Estonia, 3-3-1-19-17.
49 Decision of the Supreme Court of Estonia, 21 June 2019.
50 Administrative Court Sofia - City, 8 January 2018, dec. no. 180.
51 F. Salerno, “La costituzionalizzazione dell’ordine pubblico internazionale”, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale, 2018, p. 268.
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